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Professor David Vaver, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, York University, Toronto 
A significant sector of publishing practice involves the 
production of abridgments and abstracts, either as stand-
alone works or as part of other works. This article examines 
the copyright implications of the practice. T he perspective 
is British and Commonwealth law, with the occasional 
glance at the United States. 
I t is convenient to separate the discussion of 
abridgments from abstracts, although there is no fixed line 
between them. As a working definition, an abstract is the 
abbreviated representation of a work that gives its essential 
ideas, but is not concerned to preserve any element of the 
source work's form or expression; an abridgment, while 
also involving condensation of a literary, musical or 
dramatic work,1 draws on the source work's form or 
expression. The two typically differ in purpose. An abstract 
of an opera is meant to be read as information about the 
opera; the reader will then be encouraged (or not) to see 
a performance or read the book. An abridgment of an opera 
is, however, designed to be read or performed as a lighter 
substitute for the full work. 
The article looks at the history, Jaw and practice of 
abridgments, and follows this with a similar (abridged) 
discussion of abs.tracts. 
History of Abridgments 
Before the advent of printing, those who transcribed 
manuscripts took great liberties with them. The idea was 
not just to copy the author's words but to take down, with 
whatever personal editing one chose, so much of the 
manuscript as was thought personally valuable.2 
Old practices died hard. Even after the first Copyright 
Act of 1710, British publishers frequently abridged one 
another's works without thinking to ask for anyone's 
permission. This did not always go unchallenged. In 1739, 
a publisher complained that the Gentleman's Magazine had 
run a version of Joseph Trapp's sermons, condensing his 
I It is uncommon to talk of 'abridging' an artistic work. Certainly 
in law, reducing the size of an artistic work has been treated 
separately from literary abridgments. The latter were historically 
more excusable than 1he former: Gambart v Ball (1863) 14 CB (NS) 
306. 
2 M. Ethan Katsh, The Elertro11ic Media a11d tire Tramfonnation 
of Law, OUP, 1989, 172 to 173. 
37 pages down to 13. Samuel Johnson worked for the 
magazine and, when asked whether the complaint was 
valid, confidently said copyright had not been infringed. 
There was a strong public interest in having abridgments: 
The design of an abridgment is to benefit mankind by 
facilitating the attainmem of knowledge; and by contracting 
arguments, relations or descriptions into a narrow compass, 
to convey instruction in the easiest method, without fatiguing 
the attention, burdening the memory, or impairing the 
health of the student. 
Whatever injury the first publisher suffered had to give 
way to the public interest in having knowledge dis-
seminated as widely and cheaply as possible. A review 
could legitimately cite as much of Trapp's work as the 
Gemleman's Magazine had printed, so an author or 
publisher could hardly complain if the abridgment were 
published without the (perhaps adverse) criticism. 
Anyway, writers tended to verbosity, so an abridger did 
a public service in condensing them: indeed, without the 
threat of abridgment, writers would have no incentive to 
be brief!3 
The very next year, 1740, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
sounded much like Johnson when he sent an unauthorised 
version of Matthew Hale's Historia Placitorum Coronae 
(Pleas of the Crow11) to referees to decide whether it was 
'colourably shortened only' or a 'real and fair abridgment'. 
A 'scissors and paste' version would be stopped, but the 
impugned version was not 'so flagrant': it was titled · 
Modern Crow11 Law1 some repealed statutes and other text 
were removed so that Hale's 275 sheets became 35, and 
Latin and French quotations were translated into 
English.4 The referees held the abridgment to be fair and 
an injunction was refused. s 
The Johnson/Hardwicke line held through the 18th 
century, whether the judge sat in Chancery or a common 
Jaw court, or was pro-publisher or not.6 In 1774, 
Hardwicke's successor Apsley joined with Blackstone J 
(of Commentaries on the Laws of England fame) to endorse 
Hardwicke's views. A quarter-size abridgment, conveying 
'in language as good or better than in the original, and 
in a more agreeable and useful manner', of Hawkesworth 's 
Voyages, did not infringe the latter's copyright: 
The act of abridgment is an act of understanding, employed 
in carrying a large work into a smaller compass, and 
rendering it less expensive, and more convenient both to 
the time and use of the reader, which made an abridgment 
in the nature of a new and meritorious work. . . . An 
abridgment, where the understanding is employed in 
rcrrenching unnecessary and uninteresting circumstances, 
which rather deaden the oarratiof!, is not an act of plagiarism 
3 E.L. McAdam Jr., Dr. Jolr11son a11d 1/re E11glislr Law, Syracuse 
University Press, 1951 , 13 10 14, indica1ing Johnson's opinion was 
first published posthumously in Ge11tlcma11's Magazine in 1787. 
4 Gyles v Wilcox ( l 740) 2 Atk. 142, 143. 
5 Tonso11 v Walker (1752) 3 Swans. 672, 679, explaining Gyles v 
Wilcox, previous note. ln To11son, the 'abridgment' of annotations 
to an edition of john Milton's Paradise Lost was held 'colourable' 
and 'evasive', and was enjoined. 
6 So pro-publisher Willes j in Millar v Taylor(l 769) 4 Burr. 2303, 
2310,.and anti-publisher de Grey CJ in D,011aldson v Becket (1774), 
in 771e Literary Pmpeny Debates: Six Tram 1764-;74, Garland, 1975, 
Pan F, a1 46, both concluded that genuine abridgments did not 
infringe copyrigh1. See too Bell v Walker & Debrett (1785) I Bro. 
cc 451. 
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upon the original work, nor against any property of the 
author in it.7 
A doctrine like this may have been fine for a work like 
Hawskesworth's - 'a mere compilation of trash', as 
Thurlow called itg - in an era when writing was the 
pursuit of the leisured classes or turned out by a reviled 
Grub Street hack. But in the 19th century, attitudes 
changed as writing for money became a respectable calling 
and Parliament expanded notions of copyright. Economic 
harm to the publisher and the author, especially when the 
'author depended on royalties from sales, could not be 
dismissed as breezily as it had been in the 18th century. 
Eros.ion occurred on various fronts. First, the doctrine 
of non-infringing abridgment was confined largely to 
literary and dramatic works: copyright in an opera was held 
infringed in 1835 by arranging popular pieces from it as 
dance music,9 and in 1861 reduced scale versions of 
artistic works were also held to .infringe the latter copy-
right. 10 Second, unpublished works were excluded from 
the doctrine. This was made clear in 1849 when Queen 
Victoria and Prince Albert successfully obtained an 
injunction against the publication of a catalogue (a type 
of abridgment) containing surreptitiously obtained details 
of their private artwork. 11 Third, the view that a charge 
of infringement against an abridger could be defended by 
showing the abridgment itself had copyright12 started 
dissipating: Kelly CB in the exchequer chamber in 1868 
saw nothing incongruous in saying a derivative work could 
both have and infringe copyright.13 Thus, as the century 
progressed, the law of 'fair' abridgments began to be 
redefined, so that by century's end the mantle of 
'benefactor to mankind, by assisting in the diffusion of 
knowledge' had largely slipped off the a.bridger's 
shoulders. 14 
Writers too started aligning themselves against 
abridgments, although self-interest and irony lay close to 
the surface. As a magazine employee at the start of his 
career, Samuel Johnson could act as the champion of 
abridgers; by the 1770s, the compiler of the dictionary and 
the champion of writing as a profession found he had no 
time for them. To Boswell's comment that an abridgment 
'was only cutting the horns and tail off the cow', Johnson 
retorted, 'No sir, 'tis making the cow have a calf' .15 By 
then, Johnson's Rasselas (The Prince of Abyssinia, a Tale) 
had been reprinted with impunity, downsized to a tenth 
by leaving out all the 'moral and useful' reflections; the 
judge pointed out that Johnson's publisher, who owned 
the copyright, was complaining of something he himself 
did to others' works.16 In 1844 Charles Dickens, the 
7 Hawkeswonlt v Newberry (1774) Lofft. 775. 
8 Quoted in Augustine Birrell, Seve11 Llctures 011 the Law and 
History of Copyright in Books, Cassell, 1899, 134. 
9 D'Almaine v Boosey ( 1835) I Y. & C. 283, 301 to 302. 
JO Gambart v Ball, Note I above. 
11 P1i11ce Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 693 to 694, 
affd (1849) I H. & Tw. !. 
12 Implicit in , for example, D'Almaine v Boosey, Note 9 above, 
at 301. 
13 Wood v Roosey (1868) LR 3 QB 223, 229. 
14 Tinsley v Lace (1864) I H. & M. 747, 754. 
15 Zechariah S. Chafec, 'Reflections on Copyright Law', (1945) 45 
Columbia LR 503, 51 I, citing an incident in 1773 from Pottle and 
Bennett (eds.), Boswell's Joumal of a Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel 
Johnson, Viking, 1936, 49. 
16 Dodsley v Ki1111ersley (1761) Amb. 403, 405. 
scourge of Chancery and its delays, seemingly had little 
trouble getting an immediate injunction from the Vice-
Chancellor, stopping the publication of an unauthorised 
rival half-size edition of A Christmas Carol. 17 Yet the 
sensitive Dickens, not one easily to change a good idee ftr.e, 
never stopped complaining of the experience: 'I shall not 
easily forget the expense and anxiety and horrible injustice 
of the Carol case; where, in asserting the plainest right on 
earth, I was really treated as if I were the robber instead 
of the robbed. ' 18 
The heirs of US judge Joseph Story had more cause 
to complain. Story, who asserted that abridgments catering 
to the same market as the original were illegal, 19 had one 
of his colleagues, after Story's death, permit Story's 
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (with its section on 
abridgments) itself to be abridged! In principle, his 
colleague agreed the copyright owner alone should have 
the right to decide whether to meet any market demand 
for an abridgment. Still, the British and American 
precedents were too strong, he felt, for him to accept that 
unqualified view. He did, however, stop a third of the 
abridgment from continuing to be published because that 
part was 'unfair'. 20 The final irony is that Story's opinion 
that: 
a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of the 
original work, so as to bring the whole into a smaller 
compass, will not be held to be [a fair and bona fide] 
abridgment. There must be real, substantial condensation 
of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment 
bestowed thereon; and not merely tlie facile use of the 
scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the 
chief value of the work,21 
while not fully gaining judicial acceptance in the United 
States, was accepted as 'perhaps expressing satisfactorily' 
the English law up to the turn of the 20th century!22 
By the last quarter of the 19th century, however, the 
days of the free-roaming abridger were clearly numbered. 
In 1875 an Australian court enjoined, as a 'colourable 
alteration or adaptation', summaries that one newspaper 
made of longer articles in a rival paper's columns, using 
many of the same expressions.23 In 1878 the UK Royal 
Commission on copyright recommended that no abridg-
ments occur without the copyright owner's consent. 24 In 
1879 Eaton Drone, in his leading text on US and UK 
copyright law, said the same and excoriated the whole 
doctrine of 'fair abridgments' as a discouragement to the 
dissemination of learning: 
What would be an abridgment of Bancroft's History of the 
United States, but a reproduction of the substantial fruits 
of forty years' patient toil, and of the great learning of that 
historian? What would be an abridgment of the American 
Cyclopaedia, but an appropriation of the wealth of 
17 Dickens v Lee ( 1844) 8 jur. 183, 184. 
18 Quoted in H.M. Paull, Literary Ethics: A Study i111ltt Growth 
of the Literary Co1ucitnce, 1928, repr. 1968, Kennikat Press, 56. 
19 Gray v Russell (1839) I Story 11, I 9. 
20 Story's executors v Holcombe (1874) 4 McLean 306. 
21 Folsom v Marsh (1841) 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 345. 
22 T .E. Scruuon, The Law of Copyright, William Clowes, 1903 
(4th edn), 141. 
23 Wilson v Luke (1875) I VLR (Eq.) 127, 141. Sec 'Impermissible 
abstracts' below. 
24 Report of the Copyright Commissioners (1878), Cd. 2036, 
at JS , SS 68 and 69. 
VAVER: ABRIDGMENTS AND ABSTRACTS: COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS: (199S] S EIPR 227 
information there garnered at a cost of half a million dollars 
for literary labor alone?lS 
In Canada, P .B. Mignault (later a judge of the Supreme 
Court) said much the same in 1881, emphasising the point 
that an original abridgment could infringe, yet still have 
its own copyright. 26 
From 1886 the Berne Convention on Literary and 
Artistic Works started on its path of fully recognising 
abridgments by giving the copyright owner the right in 
Article 10 to control 
unauthorized indirect appropriations of a literary or artistic 
work, of various kinds, such as adaptations ... when they 
are only the reproduction of a particular work, in the same 
form, or in another form, without essential alterations, 
additions, or abridgments, so as not to present the character 
of a new original work. 
That the switch was almost complete by 1900 can be 
seen in a Quebec case, where a judge, basing himself on 
Dickens' Christmas Carol case, could casually remark that 
nobody ' has the right to abridge the works of another',27 
a comment that could not have fallen from the lips of any 
Commonwealth or US judge a century previously. T here 
was still the occasional instance, especially involving facts 
or news, where a judge would let pass a condensation that 
kept the source work's ideas but completely changed its 
expression, 28 but these were now glosses on a rule on its 
last legs. The time was ripe for the Jaw to be changed to 
bring abridgments fully within the copyright owner's 
control, especially now that they were temporarily 'out of 
fashion ', at least in England,29 so that any change was 
unlikely to stir up controversy. 
So it proved when the 1909 US and 1911 UK copyright 
laws passed, followed by legislation in the British 
dominions based on the UK Jaw. T he Acts clearly reflected 
the thoughts of Drone, Mignault, the UK Royal 
Commission and the Berne Convention, the US Act giving 
the copyright owner control over 'any version' of a literary 
work, the UK over 'any substantial part' or any work 'in 
any material form whatsoever'. 30 From then on, both fair 
and unfair abridgments came fully within the copyright 
owner's purview. 
Modern Law 
Defining an abridgment 
Context will determine if a work qualifies as a abridgment. 
For example, in 1923 the Privy Council in an Indian appeal 
had to deal with a school edition of Thomas North's 
English translation of Plutarch's Life of Alexander that cut 
North's translation in half. This, said Lord Atkinson for 
2S Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise of the Law of Property i11 Imellectual 
Productio1is in Great Britain and tire United States, Little Brown, 1879, 
444. 
26 P.B. Mignault, 'La Propri~tt Lim!raire', (1881) 3 La Themis 
97, 107 to 109. 
27 Beauchemi11 v Cadieux (1900) 2 Can. Comm. Law Reps. 337, 
361 (Que. CA), aff'd (1901) ibid. (Can. SC), citing Dicluns v Lee, . . 
Note 17 above. 
28 Springfield v Thame (1903) 89 LT 242, 243. 
29 Birrell, Note 8 above, at I SB. 
30 Copyright Act 1909 (US), S l(b), Copyright Act 1911 (UK), 
section 1(2). See also Copyright Act 1921 (Can.), section 3(1); 
Chafce, Note IS above; Stanifonh Ricketson, The Law of lntellecrual 
Property, Law Book, 1984, § 9.68. 
the court, was just a 'selection of scraps', not a real 
abridgment: 
Strictly speaking, an abridgment of an author's work means 
a statement designed to be complete and accurate of the 
thoughts, opinions, and ideas by him expressed therein, but 
set forth much more concisely in compressed language of 
the abridger. A publication ... the text of which consists 
of a number of detached passages selected from an author's 
work, often not contiguous, but separaced from those which 
preceded and follow them by considerable bodies of print 
knit together by a few words so as to give these passages, 
when reprinted, the appearance as far as possible of a 
continuous narrative, is not an abridgment at all. 31 
The issue w::ts whether enough skill and lahour had gone 
into creating the school edition for it to have copyright 
as an original literary work. Atkinson said there had not. 
Anyone could copy the selection (but, of course, not the 
editor's accompanying notes). Had the compiler abridged 
North's work instead of using scissors and paste, this 
would have been an original work entitled to copyright. 
Today in ordinary parlance the school edition of 
North's translation would nonetheless probably be called 
an 'abridgment': Atkinson's 'a number of detached 
passages selected from an author's work ... knit together 
by a few words so as to give these passages, when 
reprinted, the appearance as far as possible of a continuous 
narrative' seems almost a textbook definition. True, the 
work would have no copyright today, any more than it 
did in the 1920s, but the context in which the issue arose 
today would typically be different. A publisher acquiring 
the 'right to abridge' from a copyright owner probably 
could adopt the method of North's editor and stay within 
his right. In the United States, the published version would 
have to be marked as 'abridged' to prevent buyers from 
mistakenly believing they were getting all of North's or 
Plutarch's work.32 This seems good practice elsewhere 
too, Jest the version offend local laws against deceptive or 
misleading labelling. 
Condensations, digests and selections 
Reprint licences today frequently sell the rights to make 
an 'abridgment, digest , condensation, or selection' of the 
source work, without clearly discriminating between these 
categories. ·A careful publisher will want to acquire all four 
of these rights; otherwise, it may find its particular form 
of paring down is unauthorised and an infringement. 
How do these versions differ from one another? 
According to one US text, abridgments omit whole sec-
tions and do not claim to be the complete work; condensa-
tions, on the other hand, do claim to represent the whole 
work, while compressing or editing by omitting words, 
descriptions or other elements thought inessential. 33 
31 Macmillan v K. & J. Cooper (1923) 130 LT 675, 678 (PC). 
32 Re 171e New America11 Library of World Literature b1c. (1955) 
SI FTC 583, aff'd 227 F.2d 384. 
33 Michael Landau (ed.), Lindey 011 Emerrainment, Publishing and 
the Arts: Agreements and the Law, Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1981 
(2nd cdn), updated annually, at l-IS4. For descriptions of how 
publishers abridge, sec Thomas L. Bonn, Heavy Traffic and High 
Cu/Jure, Southern Illinois University Press, 1989, 78 to 83 (New 
American Library); Thomas Wcyr, 'The Booming Book Clubs', 
in The Busi11ess of Publishing: A PW Amhology, R.R. Bowker Co., 
1976, 2S9, 279 (Reader's Digest Condensed Books). 
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Whether the public sees it this way is doubtful. During 
the 1950s the practice of bringing out a paperback 
containing a shortened version of the hardcover book 
attracted the attention of the US Federal Trade Com-
mission. It heard that some paperbacks cut the hardcover 
contents down by as little as 5 per cent, while others cut 
as much as 66 per cent. The Commission directed pub-
lishers somehow to tell the public the paperback was 
shorter but left it to them whether to mark the item 
'abridged' or 'condensed'.34 Without guidelines, pub-
lishers chose whichever word felt best for marketing 
reasons. A further complication is that meanings may differ 
between countries and even regions, depending on local 
usage and trade practice. Thus, what the Privy Council 
in 1923 thought was an 'abridgment' might, in US 
parlance, be a 'condensation'. 
Still, the view of a New York judge, that a condensa-
tion, unlike a 'selection', cannot 'leave out the major 
portion' of the source work,35 sounds about right. The 
New American Library, licensed to publish only 'con-
densations' in single or multiple paperback volumes, was 
stopped from issuing a version of Joy of Cooki11g in four 
volumes that contained a '.hjghly selective' fraction of the 
source work's recipes and omitted much of the text. 
In distinguishing 'selection' from 'condensation', the 
judge did not define 'condensation' for all contracts or 
contexts; he merely interpreted the word as used in a 
particular deal. In one provision of that contract, the 
copyright owner agreed not to license a competing 
paperback 'abridgment or condensation, or adaptation or 
selection'; in an earlier contract, the same clause had left 
out 'selection'. From this, the judge inferred the parties 
understood these terms to involve different processes and 
products - although they probably did not appreciate 
where these subtleties might lead in practice. Whether 
'condensation' is the same as 'digest', and how an 
'abridgment' differs, if at all, from either, is !\till up in 
the air. 
Given the temptation among lawyers to find a 
distinction between what, to most people, would be 
synonyms, negotiators must strive for greater clarity on 
these points in their contract to avoid costly disputes down 
the road. 
What may be Abridged 
A person may freely abridge any work that is out of 
copyright. Otherwise the copyright owner's consent to an 
abridgment - whether a complete rewrite or using 
'scissors and paste' or the electronic equivalent - must 
be obtained because this reproduces a substantial part of 
the work. 
Abridgments that do not reproduce a substantial part 
of a work are allowed, but what amounts to a 'substantial 
part' can be contentious. A short description of a work's 
contents, like an abstract, should pass muster. A good 
working rule is that an abridgment can be made without 
the copyright owner's consent if it does not (1) substitute 
for the source work, (2) harm the work's present market, 
34 Note 32 above, at 585, §4 of the findings of fact; at 587, §1 
of the order. 
35 The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. v New American Library (1985) 
Copyright Law Decisions §25,752, at 19,375. 
and (3) harm a potential market that ought fairly be the 
author's. Point (3), involving moral judgment, is the most 
unstable and contentious of all these hurdles. (See further 
'Infringement' and 'Conclusion ' below.) 
An abridgment cannot pass itself off as the unabridged 
version. When the forthcoming English publication of 
Frank Harris's My Life and Loves was announced in 1964, 
another publisher acquired the publication right to the 
abridged and expurgated version. This it proposed to 
release as Frank Harris: My Life and Loves, with a large 
star on the cover containing the words The original 
expurgated and abridged version. Previous abridgments had 
appeared in 1947 and 1958 as Frank Harris: My Life and 
Adventures. The second publisher would have been in the 
clear had the unabridged version had no pre-release 
publicity. As it was, the publicity had given the latter 
version a reputation as My Life and Loves. Buyers might 
mistake an abridged version with this title for the 
unabridged version. A British judge was unimpressed by 
the second publisher's attempt 'to cash in on the 
advertisement and rr.putation' of the unabridged book and 
halted the issue under the confusing title.36 
Copyright in Abridgments 
Originality 
Works that qualify as abridgments, as defined in the case 
involving North's translation of Plutarch37 (a definition 
not found in any Copyright Act), should have copyright, 
but so may other shortened works. A 'scissors and paste' 
digest may reveal a new pattern or idea not evident in the 
source work. Although more common where there are 
several works and authors, this could occur with the works 
of one author, even a single work. The result should then, 
if enough skill and labour have gone into the selection or 
arrangement, be original enough to qualify for a separate 
copyright. 
Whether an abridgment involving industrious collec-
tion but little skill in condensation is original may be 
contentious today. For example, it takes time and money 
to search and condense public records to compile a 
mercantile gazette giving a picture of companies' credit 
rating. Traditionally, this work would have copyright 
under the relaxed standards of originality prevailing in the 
Commonwealth.38 In the United States, however, the 
mechanical work involved in compiling and 'condensing 
may not involve enough authorship or originality to 
warrant a copyright, at least since the Feist case in 1991.39 
This stricter view could easily spill over into Common-
wealth practice, since judges treat originality as a question 
36 W.H. Allen & Co. v Brow11 l\7a1Son Ltd (1965] RPC 191, 194. 
37 Note 31 :;.bove. 
38 T.M. Hall & Ca. v Whi11ington & Co. (1892) 18 VLR 525; 
University of London Press Ltdv University Tutorial Press Ltd (1916) 
2 Ch. 60 I, 608, suggesting pre-1911 protection of 'a list of registered 
bills of sale, a list of foxhounds and hunting days, and trade 
C8talogucs' would continue after the 1911 UK Act, which first 
introduced the originality criterion. Simil~ly, Walterv La11e (1900) 
AC 539, followed under the 1911 and 1956 UK Acts in Sands & 
MacDougall Pty Ltd v Robinson (1917) 23 CLR 49, Express 
Newspapers pie v News (UK) Ltd (1990] l WLR 1320, and Television 
New Zealand v Newsmo11i1or Seroices Ltd (1993) 27 IPR 441, 454 
to 455 (on similar New Zealand law). 
39 Feist Publicatiom Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc. (1991) 
111 S.Ct. 1282. 
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of fact and degree and so factor in their views on the merits 
of a particular work or activity. 
Authorship and ownership 
The selector or abridger is the author of the work and 
entitled to the copyright, unless the work is done under 
a contract of employment, in which case the employer is 
the copyright owner. The copyright owner of the source 
work may, of course, also require in her contract that the 
abridgment copyright be transferred to her. Someone 
copying the abridgment without the consent of its 
copyright owner infringes copyright in both the original 
work and the abridgment. Either owner can sue to protect 
her separate interest. 
Abridgment that infringes copyright 
Commonwealth copyright laws typically protect all original 
work; there is no qualification that the work must be 
' lawful ' or 'authorised'. The inference is, as a British judge 
has perceptively noted,40 that an original work may be 
protected even if it infringes another's copyright. This was 
suggested as long ago as 1868, where Kelly CB said obiter 
- the case involved an authorised work - that an 
unauthorised arrangement of a musical work, though 
infringing copyright, would 'certainly' have copyright in 
England.'11 US law differs: protection is explicitly denied 
to derivative works to the extent pre-existing material has 
been used 'unlawfully'.42 . 
The history of the Berne Convention supports the 
validity of Kelly's 1868 dictum today. The first Berne 
Convention in 1886, in protecting one sort of derivative 
work - translations - explicitly protected only ' lawful' 
(that is, 'authorised') versions. By the time of the 1908 
revision of Berne, matters had progressed. Not only were 
other types of derivative works now protected - including 
'adaptations' and 'other reproductions in an altered form' 
(which would include abridgments) - but the reference 
to 'lawful ' was now deleted. Instead, all original derivative 
works were protected 'without prejudice to the rights of 
the author of the original work'. The intent, unchanged 
in later versions of the Convention, was plainly to give the 
maker of an unauthorised derivative work recourse against 
copiers, while preserving the source work owner's power 
to stop both versions. 43 US law, in denying copyright to 
an unauthorised abridgment, therefore offends the 
Convention. 44 
The point was fully debated in the United Kingdom 
in evidence taken before the copyright committee chaired 
by Lord Gorell. In its report in 1909, the committee 
concluded it was 'doubtful ' under UK law whether 
unauthorised derivative works were protected. The 
committee, over two dissents, recommended UK law to 
40 Robert Goff J in Redwood Music Ltd v Chappell & Co. Ltd 
[1982] RPC 109, 120. 
41 Wood v Boosey, Note 13 above, a1 229. This was no casual 
remark: counsel had argued the contrary a1 226. 
42 Copyright Act 1976 (US), S 103(a). 
43 Staniforth Ricketson, The Berne Conven1io11 for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986, Kluwer, 1987, 289. 
44 This non-conformity was not noticed in the Preliminary Repon 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on US Adherence to the Berne 
Convention, (1986) 33 Jo. Copr. Soc. 183, 261, where the relevant 
Berne Article, 2(3) of the Paris 1971 revision, is cited. 
be amended to conform with the Berne Convention.4> 
Accordingly, like the Convention, the Copyright Act 1911 
and the later Acts of 1956 and 1988 said nothing about 
a work's having to be authorised or lawful before having 
protection. Commonwealth statutes modelled on the 1911 
and 1956 Acts maintained this silence. 
Judicial opinion in the Commonwealth is nevertheless 
conflicting,46 partly because courts have not referred to 
the Berne Convention or the Gorell committee report. This 
should be corrected now that Commonwealth courts accept 
a wider range of material to assist in their interpretation 
of legislation. The result will be to allow an unauthorised 
abridgment to have its own copyright. The abridger should 
get the usual remedies in respect of the copying. He can 
stop even the copyright owner of the original work from 
using the abridgment, but this will be cold comfort, since 
the latter can equally enjoin the abridgment.47 
Credit Lines; Harmful Abridgments 
An abridgment should not be credited to the author 
without the latter's consent. One that omits parts that the 
author thinks vital to the work's integrity might also reflect 
prejudicially on the author's honour or reputation. In 
either case, the author should be able to obtain relief by 
injunction or damages for infringement of her moral rights. 
To avoid problems, it is often sensible to persuade the 
author to do the abridging herself or to nominate someone 
she can trust to do it. 48 
Sometimes an objecting author can be placated without 
too much expense. Contested passages or the author's 
credit line can be altered on existing stock, and advertising 
can correct any rnisimpression relating to sold stock. But 
prevention is better than cure. Where the author is not 
the copyright owner, the intending abridger should make 
sure that either the author has waived her moral rights or 
both owner and author authorise, preferably in writing, 
the version and the credit line. 
The dangers of abridging without the consent of both 
the author and the copyright owner are iJlustrated by the 
well-known US case involving the British comedy team 
Monty Python. In 1975 the ABC television network 
broadcast a programme of three episodes of the •Monty 
Python's Flying Circus' comedy show that was 24 minutes 
shorter than the original 90 minutes . ABC's sub-licence 
allowed it to edit for offensive material and to insert 
commercials, but the head licence from Python allowed 
no such editing. Python successfully sued to stop further 
similar broadcasts. A licensor cannot grant more rights 
than it acquires, so the broad editing clause in ABC's sub-
licence was ineffective. In any event, airing the programme 
would lead viewers falsely to believe ABC's edited version 
45 Report of the Committee on the Law of Copyright, Cd. 4976 
(1909), at 9 and 10. Mr W. Johnson-Hicks MP (at 31) and Mr E. 
Trevor LI. Williams (at 32) dissented. The committee's principal 
example was the unlawful translation, but it plainly recognised the 
point concerned all derivative works. 
46 Vaver, 'Translation and Copyright: A Canadian Focus', [1994] 
4 EIPR 159, 161, referring to some of the authorities. 
47 Vaver, previous note, analyses the rights between the 
unauthorised translator and the source work owner in a way that 
appljcs, mutatis mutandis, to the unauthorised abridger. See also 
William J. Braithwaite, ' Derivative Works in Canadian Copyright 
Law', (1982) 20 Osgoode Hall LJ 192, 205 and onward. 
48 Bonn, Note 33 above, at 81. 
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was Monty Python's work. One judge thought ABC 
should preface the broadcast with a disclaimer like: 'The 
members of Monty Python wish to disassociate themselves 
from this programme, which is a compilation of their 
shows edited by ABC without their approval'. The court 
majority disagreed, saying ABC should not show the edited 
programmes at all: 
We are doubtful that a few words could erase the indelible 
impression that is made by a television broadcast, especially 
since the viewer has no means of comparing the truncated 
version with the complete work in order to determine for 
himself the talents of [Monty Python). Furthermore, a 
disclaimer ... would go unnoticed by viewers who tuned 
into the broadcast a few minutes after it began. 49 
The US court was willing to protect Monty Python as 
authors of the programme scripts even if they were not 
copyright owners. In countries following a strict moral 
rights regime, Monty Python as authors could claim their 
right of integrity was violated by the airing of a mutilated 
programme, since their honour or reputation would be 
prejudiced and they had not earlier waived their right to 
object. 
Despite this, moral rights are often enjoyed more in 
theory than practice. Many broadcasters believe that, 
having paid for a product, they can do what they like with 
it and are left cold by authors' concerns about artistic 
integrity. Claims like Monty Python's are rare because 
copyright owners and authors who get a reputation for 
being meddlesome will be shunned by the industry. 
Significantly, Monty Python has reappeared in North 
America principally on public, non-commercial, television. 
Permitted Abridgments 
Some abridgments may be treated as fair dealings for 
purposes of private study, research, criticism, review or 
reporting current events. 50 Other times, the abridgment 
may not take a substantial part of the source work. This 
is how in Commonwealth states parodies try to justify 
themselves, with variable success. 
An important English decision, further discussed 
below, found the story summaries and lengthy quotations 
contained in typical student study aids (Coles Notes) 
infringed copyright in the source works. It was not a fair 
dealing to include summaries or quotations as full as those 
found in the aids if the main purpose was simply criticism. 
As for genuine literary criticism, the judge added: 
[T]he appearance in a critic's work of long extractS from 
an in-copyright work does not mean that the critic has been 
regarded as entitled to reproduce those extracts. It may be 
that some licence, free or otherwise, has been granted in 
respect of the extracts. s1 
The judge cited a 1958 agreement between British 
publishers and authors, which says that extracts exceeding 
800 words, while possibly fair dealings, would normally 
require permission. 
This arrangement, no doubt convenient for authors and 
49 Gilliam v ABC (1976) 538 F .2d l4, 25, n. 13. For the earlier 
court proceedings, see Henrik Henzberg, 'Onward and Upward 
with the Ans: Naughty BitS ', New Yorker, 29 March 1976, 69. 
SO Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), sections 29, 30. 
51 Sillitoe v McGrtrurHill Book Co. (UK) Lid (1983) FSR 545, 559. 
publishers, is not an authentic interpretation of the 
copyright law and cannot bind those not party to it. 
Literary or other criticism need not engage in word counts, 
if the critic is plainly reviewing or criticising and not 
supplanting the copyright owner's market. A critic can 
sometimes quote even the whole work without seeking 
permission.52 This was what Jacques Derrida felt he had 
to do in his rambling riposte in 1978 to a journal article 
of philosopher John R. Searle's criticising Derrida. 53 Far 
from supplanting or harming the market for the source 
work, criticisms like Derrida's will likely cause readers to 
return to it to verify the accuracy of the criticism. Derrida 
is simply replaying a practice stretching back centuries, 
where reproducing as much as a quarter of the source work 
was considered fair dealing, if the extracts were inter-
spersed with genuine criticism. 54 The 1993 decision in the 
English Clockwork Orange case, allowing 8 per cent of the 
movie to be reproduced in a critical television broad-
cast,55 harkens back to this older practice and applies it 
to the newer media. In doing so, it corrects the sometimes 
over-protective attitudes copyright owners adopt in respect 
of their work. 
Extensive quotation of source material forms a 
justifiable part of literary practice. An author who puts 
work before the public (or retracts it) cannot be immune 
from criticism. If someone believes the work or some 
practice relating to it is, for some reason, bad or misguided, 
the law should not compel him to seek the author's 
permission to quote enough to make the point. The author 
may care about her pocket or may (as in the Clockwork 
Orange case) have different concerns about the criticism 
and its validity; but it is precisely here that the law should 
allow, indeed encourage, the critic to quote without her 
leave, for it is precisely here that the author will refuse 
permission and that the public interest favours letting the 
criticism be heard. 
Contracts 
The standard publisher's contract for a literary work deals 
expressly with the right to publish or authorise the 
publication of abridginents or condensations, either as a 
volume or in a magazine or newspaper. Typically, the 
publisher acts as the author 's agent to license these rights, 
52 Hubbard o Vosper (1972] 2 QB 84, 98. See also Birrell, Note 
8 above, at 181 : ' Suppose the volume reviewed be one of sonnets 
or short lyrics or epigrams, bow can a reviewer get on without the 
privilege of complete quotation? . .. The test must always be: Are 
the quotations introduced to illustrate the criticism, or a vulgar peg 
on which to hang the quotations?' 
53 Jacques Derrida, ' Limited Inc', (1978) 2 Glyph 162. Derrida 
was aware of the copyright implications of his practice: after saying 
'I believe that I will have cited [Searlc's article) from beginning 
to end', be then asks 'Did I have the right(s)?' 
54 For example Whiuingham v Woo/er (1817) 2 Swans. 428, 431 
(15 per cent of play reproduced in journal); Bell v Whitehead (1839) 
8 LJ Ch. 141 (25 per cent of periodical article reproduced in another 
pe.riodical; interlocutory injunction refused, and plaintilTleft to go 
before common law jury if he wanted damages). 
55 Time Warner Enurtainmtnt Co. LP v Channel Four Television 
Corp. [1994) EMLR I. David Bradshaw in 'Fair Dealing and the 
Clockwork Orange Case: "A Thieves' Charter"?' (1994) I ENT.LR 
I , 11 hopes the decision 'represents the high-water mark' of fair 
dealing under the 1988 UK Act. Had the case involved the print 
media of the 18th or 19th centuries, it would have fallen easily 
between the tides. 
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and proceeds are split SO/SO between author and 
publisher.s6 The 90/10 split recommended by a Canadian 
writers' unionS7 is optimistic - even the Australian 
writers' union recommends only 8012058 - but these 
higher percentages can be aimed for if the author herself 
is doing the abridgment. In some US contracts, rights to 
exploit the works outside the United States, including 
condensations, are split 7S/2S between author and 
publisher. 
An author should be explicit, both in her publishing 
contract and in any licence agreement her publisher grants, 
if she wishes to retain final approval of any condensed or 
abridged version. 59 Even without an explicit provision, 
she can insist that a licensed version of her work prom-
inently indicate if it has been abridged or condensed60 
and that it also point out any omissions or changes. 6! 
Beyond that, the author can probably stop the continued 
publication of an abridged or condensed version that 
distorts her intent or is otherwise poorly done. But prior 
vetting is always better than trying to remedy bad work 
after publication. 
Infringement 
As already noted, an abridgment may, even if itself original 
enough to have copyright, infringe copyright in the source 
work if it reproduces or adapts a substantial part of the 
latter. It is irrelevant that many think the abridgment 
better than its source: a copier infringes even where he 
improves the source work. 62 
A leading Canadian example involves the abridgment 
in 1981 into one volume of a seven-volume report on The 
State of Competition in the Canadia1i Petroleum lndust1y. The 
report, written by the director in charge of Canada's 
competition laws, was published under the federal 
government's direction. The abridger produced his version 
in two weeks by 'scissors and paste'. He did not rewrite 
or include criticism, and the version probably did not 
qualify for copyright. It came out four weeks after the 
government's publication. The government successfully 
sued the abridger for infringement. The trial judge - a 
former speaker of the Canadian House of Commons -
ordered the abridger simply to pay damages equivalent to 
the royalties the government would have charged for 
granting permission, but he was reversed on appeal. As 
well as damages, the federal court of appeal awarded an 
injunction, delivery up and costs. Even though the 
government had d istributed many of its copies free and 
had little economic interest in enforcing its copyright, the 
appeal court said a copyright owner was normally entitled 
to an injunction to stop infringement, and the government 
should have the same remedies in this respect as a private 
litigant.63 
56 Charles Clark, P11blishi11g Agreements, George Allen & Unwin, 
1984 (2nd edn), 18 to 19; Lazar Sarna, Authors a11d Publishers, 
Butterworths, 1987 (2nd edn), 98. 
57 William Klebeck, An Author's Guide to Book Publishing 
Co111racts, Saskatchewan Writers Guild, 1981, 37. 
58 Colin Golvan and Michael McDonald, Writtn and the Law, Law 
Book Co., 1986, 31. 
59 Li11dey, Note 33 above, at 1- 155, Form 1.10-2. 
60 Re The New American Library of World Li1tra1ure Ilic., Note 
32 above. 
61 Chesler v Avo11 Book Division, Heant Pubs. Inc. (1973) 352 
NYS2d 552, 557. 
62 Alexander v Mack.enzie-(1847) 9 SC 748, 759. 
63 R v Jnmtr Lorimer {'<f Cn. I .rd (19R4) 77 C.PR (2d) 262. 
An English case around the same time is equally 
interesting. It involved the UK distribution of Coles Notes 
student aids for G.B. Shaw's St Joan, Alan Sillitoe's 
Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runner and Laurie Lee's 
Cider with Rosie. Coles Notes condensed the works down 
to about S per cent, taking striking phrases and changing 
direct speech into indirect. They also interspersed 
commentary, questions and criticism. The Notes' version 
of Cider with Rosie - and this presumably applied to the 
other works - did not 'significantly substitute' for Cider, 
but 'an idle student might seek to rely on the Notes alone'. 
The court said the digests infringed the copyright in all 
the works. The digest of Shaw's St Joan also infringed 
the right of turning the drama into a non-dramatic 
work. 64 The judge said he did not think the digests were 
necessary if the aim were simply to criticise the works, 
adding: 
I am not sorry to reach this conclusion. It does not seem 
right to me that anyone should be able to put on the market 
a study aid of chis kind, making full and free use of an 
original work without reference co the copyright owner.65 
This has been the US position for many years. When 
Harvard economics professor F.W. Taussig published his 
Pri11ciples of Eco11omics in 1911 and immediately prescribed 
it for his courses, students faced with the daunting task 
of absorbing the work turned for help to a private tutor. 
The tutor held 30 sessions; for each he prepared single-
page typewritten outlines that, in total, epitomised most 
ofTaussig's book. These were handed out to the students 
and discussed during the tutorial, but had to be returned 
at the end of class or shortly after. The tutor also prepared 
a compendium of these outlines that he lent to students 
preparing for mid-year and final examinations at Harvard 
economics courses in which Taussig was prescribed 
reading. The tutor admitted students might think, con-
trary to his recommendation, that the outlines substituted 
for the book itself. Fearing the professor's captive market 
might erode, Taussig's publisher Macmillan obtained an 
injunction against the tutor for infringement. Although 
Taussig's market was not currently harmed, Macmillan 
wanted to stop more extensive and harmful abridgment 
practices from developing. 66 
Neither the Macmillan nor Coles decision was appealed. 
The defendants had to make their peace with the copyright 
owner, change their practices to avoid infringement or 
simply retire from the market. However Coles might 
exhort students not to rely on the Notes, it could hardly 
expect all to listen. To the extent students refrain from 
buying the source work, the copyright owner's market is 
injured and she should be entitled to protect it. 
In Coles, the judge's attention was to some extent 
diverted from the critical question: did the Notes cut into 
the sale of the original works, or into the performances 
of StJoa11? As noted earlier, he relied partly on the 1958 
agreement reached between the British Publishers' 
Association and the Society of Authors that permission 
should normally be sought for extracts of more than 800 
words taken from a work, and partly on his feeling that 
64 Sillitoe, Note 51 above, at 549 to 55 I. 
65 Ibid. , at 564. 
66 Macmillan v King (1914) 223 F. 862, 867. The judge was 
gracious enough to allow the cutor to continue lecturing on the 
book's contents; the students might also continue taking their own 
notes of the lectures. 
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Coles' British distributors were 'enriching themselves' by 
these uses.67 Both reasons are suspect. 
First, why an agreement reached between some pub-
lishers and some authors should affect other publishers, 
the reading pub Uc generally or students in particular, none 
of whom were parties to or provided input into the agree-
ment, is a mystery. No publisher or author sought to get 
Parliament's approval to this arrangement. It is remini-
scent of the way the London stationers in the 17th and 
18th centuries tied up the market by 'gentlemen's agree-
ments' and went to court to claim these were customs that 
judges should enforce against parties and non-parties alike. 
Those arguments were ignored from the late 18th century. 
They have not improved with age: 
It seems dear that many copyright holders arc actively 
promoting the notion that users may quote or reproduce 
copyrighted material only at the sufferance of the copyright 
owner. If such fallacies go unchallenged long enough, they 
are likely to become a substitute for the truth. It is 
important, therefore, that all overly restrictive and spurious 
guidelines . . . be directly refuted. 68 
Second, Coles was no doubt 'enriching' itself, but the 
law does not generally care about this unless the 
enrichment occurs unjustly and at the expense of another. 
This certainly happens when the source work's market is 
eroded by competing digests. Where there is no erosion, 
the copyright owner's claim is then that a digest might 
affect her market and that, as the best judge of this, she 
should also have the right to control the digest market. 
This she will do by either preventing it altogether or being 
paid royalties to cover the prospect of market loss. The 
argument is ultimately a weak one because it leads logically · 
to the copyright owner's being able to claim ~hat every 
potentially detrimental use of her work should be within 
her control, a position no copyright law has ever taken. 
Unless her fear of market harm has some soUd factual 
basis, the copyright owner should not be able to prevent 
the circulation of digests. 
These arguments are, of course, to some extent 
theoretical. In practice, business people will avoid litigating 
them. A publisher wanting to condense will generally pay 
for a permission and treat it as a cost of doing business, 
instead of putting a project on hold and paying lawyers 
and judges for their costly and time-consuming exercises. 
The Coles case, right or wrong, is a reality. It gives a 
copyright owner enough ammunition to scare most risk-
averse publishers into treating with the owner or 
abandoning the project. Were Shakespeare still in 
copyright, his heirs could prevent the publication of 
Charles and Mary Lamb's Tales from Shakespeare (1807) 
for children, and other reductions such as the half-hour 
version of Macbeth mounted in 1994 by the Waterside 
Theatre Company of Stratford.69 Consequences Uke these 
remind us that copyright enforcement carries social and 
aesthetic implications that need to be weighed when the 
decision whether or not to grant protection is made. Special 
vigilance and justification is needed where a practice does 
not undercut the ·demand or value of a source work, but 
67 Sillitoe, Note SI above, at 564. 
68 L. Ray Patterson and Stanley W . Lindberg, The Nature of 
Copyriglu: A Law of Users' Rights, University of Georgia, 1991, 11. 
69 David Ward, 'Cut to the Quick', Guardia11 \17eekly, 29 May 
1994, at i6. 
instead makes its message available to those who might 
otherwise pass it by. 
Abstracts 
Definition 
For our purposes, an abstract is an abbreviated 
representation of a work, typically much shorter than an 
abridgment, that gives its essential ideas rather than its 
form or expression. It may be produced by the author of 
the work or by another person. 70 Since an abstract 
normally promotes, without supplanting, the source work, 
it should not usually infringe its copyright. It may also 
itself involve enough skiJI and effort to have copyright as 
an original literary work. 
The typical abstract deals with articles from scientific 
or other academic journals, or summarises material such 
as legislation or administrative or judicial decisions, but 
the range of material is unlimited. Thus, a British record 
catalogue of the 1930s containing synopses of operas, of 
which the record company publishing the catalogue bad 
made records, did not infringe the copyright in the 
opera.71 Today authors and publishers widely accept the 
legiLimacy of abstracts that do not compete with or 
diminish the authority of the source work, and that instead 
draw attention to it and promote its use or purchase. 
Abstracts with an opposite effect can be infringe-
ments. 72 Though shorter, they have the same economic 
impact as abridgments, which cause users to avoid the 
source work because they feel satisfied with the condensed 
version. The copyright owner is entitled to prevent this 
harm to her economic interest, however the condensed 
version is categorised. 
Abstracts distinguished from other forms 
Copyright Acts do not generally refer specifically to 
abstracts, but in practice two types of reduced versions 
may reproduce a substantial part of the source work and 
thus will require the prior consent of the copyright owner: 
extracts and long abstracts. 
Extracts 
An extract presents an abbreviated form of the work by 
taking and stringing key sentences from it into a connected 
piece. It is typically longer than an abstract, 20 to 30 per 
cent of the source work, compared with the abstract's S 
to 10 per cent or less. An extract Uke this takes a substantial 
part of the source work and requires authorisation.73 
Of course, taking occasional short extracts may not 
infringe where it involves only an insubstantial part of a 
work. This was overlooked in a New Zealand case 
involving a transcript service that monitored television 
broadcasts for clients. The courts found that transcribing 
segments up to 2t minutes long off news programmes fell 
within the fair dealing exception for research or private 
70 For varieties of abstracts, see Harold Borko and Charles L. 
Bernier, Abstracti11g Co11cepts and Methods, Academic Press, 1975, 
14 [O 24. 
71 Valcare11glzi v 111e Gra111oplzo11e Co. Ltd (1928- 35) MCC 301, 
303 10 304. 
72 Wai11Wrigli1 Securities Inc. v Wall St. Transcript Corp. (19n) 
558 F.2d 91. 
73 Borko and Bernier, Note 70 above, a1 2 l. 
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study, but transcripts of longer segments, though for the 
same purpose, were unfair because they took too much 
and so infringed the broadcaster's copyright. Among the 
transcripts the court held to be a fair dealing was a single 
8-second setttence of financial news.74 Taking a sound-bite 
as short as this should never be infringement; the purpose 
the taker had in mind or the content of the sentence ('e 
= mc2• or the more mundane fact that the central bank 
had cut its interest rates) should be irrelevant. No doubt, 
one might press into service the basic principle that 
copyright law should not protect ideas that are standardly 
expressed only in a limited range of ways. Just as 
fundamentally, when copyright laws allow the copyright 
owner to control 'any substantial part' of her work, 
'substantial' connotes something significant in terms of 
quantity, quality or both, while 'part' connotes something 
more than a 'particle'.75 So any extract that is not (a) 
significant in amount, and simultaneously (b) an essential 
or material feature of a work, is free for all to take and 
use as they like. The de minimis principle, so expressed, 
performs an important function in counteracting bloated 
claims to control the basic blocks of communication such 
as phrases and isolated sentences. 
Long abstracts 
Some abstracts may run to 25 per cent of the source work 
and be as much as 10,000 words long, depending on the 
size of the source.76 T his will very likely be the taking of 
a substantial part of the source work, requiring 
authorisation. 
It will be recalled that in the Coles Notes case, digests 
of as little as 5 per cent the size of the source works were 
found to infringe copyright. A six-page synopsis of the six 
scenes and epilogue of Shaw's St Joan, however, escaped 
criticism. 77 Whether this was because the synopsis did 
not take a substantial part of the play or for some other 
reason is unclear . 
Copyright in Abstracts 
Abstracts as part of literary work 
There are abstracts and abstracts. T he six-page synopsis 
of St Joan, if produced separately, involved enough 
original work to have its own copyright as a literary work. 
If included within a larger work, the synopsis would also 
be a substantial part of it. Shorter abstracts like the 
headnotes a legal reporter produces of a judicial decision 
also generally involve enough time and skill for each to 
be an original literary work. 78 Some abstracts of a few 
lines involving less thought or literary skill may not have 
their own copyright; even if they did, taking one might 
be too minor a matter to amount to infringement. 
74 Te/evisio11 New aala11d v News111011itor Services Lld, Note 38 
above, at 448, 467. 
75 Chatttr1011 fl Cave (1878) 3 AC 483, 491 to 492 (HL). 
76 Borko and Bernier, Note 70 above, at 11 ; Robert Collison, 
Abstracts and Abstracting Services, ABC-Clio, 1971 , 13. 
77 Sillitoe, Noce S 1 above. 
78 Swtet v Benning (1855) 16 CB 459, 481 to 482; Hall v Crosbie 
& Co. (1931) 66 Irish LT 22. 
Compilation of abstracts 
A short abstract could also be composed as part of a 
collection of many abstracts. If enough skill or judgment 
in selecting or arranging the collection is involved, it may 
itself have copyright as an .original compilation. 
Taking a single short abstract from a compilation 
should not infringe because one abstract is not likely a 
substantial part of it. There might be infringement if the 
same person systematically took one or two abstracts, 
whenever he wished, from every compilation as it came 
out. There would almost certainly be infringement if all 
or a significant number of abstracts from a single com-
pjlation were reproduced without the copyright owner's 
authority, or without a specific exemption such as fair 
dealing covering the taker's activity. Take the case of law 
reports issued in parts, containing a full report of decided 
cases and an abstract of each case alongside the report. 
Another publisher cannot issue a collection of some or most 
of the abstracts, and it does not matter that he rearranges 
them on a different system.79 An injunction may issue 
against copying future abstracts, even though their 
copyright does not yet exist. so 
Infringement 
Permissible abstracts 
Two leading examples of permissible abstracts involve th< 
opera publisher Ricordi's attempt to enforce copyrights 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. In 1911 
Ricordi sued the US publisher of a book called Opera 
Stories, claiming that a half-page 300-word synopsis of a 
three-act 46-page opera infringed the opera's copyright. 
T he US courts disagreed. Had Opera Stories been a 
collection of abridgments, it might have been stopped. By 
an abridgment, the court meant: 
[a] colorable shortening of the original text, where immaterial 
incidents are omitced and voluminous dissertations are cut 
down, but where the characters, the plot, the language and 
the ideas of the author are pirated. 
Instead, the book: 
does not use the author's language, it does not appropriate 
his ideas and it does not reproduce bis characters ... It gives 
just enough information to put the reader upon inquiry, 
precisely as the syllabus of a law report, the review of a book 
or the description of a painting induces the reader to examine 
further.SI 
In 1931 Ricordi tried again to stop the practice of 
abstracting operas, this time in the United Kingdom. A 
record company had produced a catalogue called Opera 
at Home. Its abstracts were more elaborate than those in 
Opera Stories. The description of each opera started with 
the characters, a history, sometimes the persons who had 
performed it, and then a summary of the opera, with a 
few short quotations from the dialogue. Ricordi, although 
its own book of the opera commenced with a synopsis, 
failed once more. The abstracts simply outlined the overall 
79 Swtet v Benning, Note 78 above, at 482. 
80 T.M. Hall & Co. v U:thiui11g1011 & Co., No1c 38 above. 
81 G. Ricardi & Co. fl Mason (1911) 201 F: 182, 183, refusing 
a pre-trial injunction. Same result at the trial: 201 F. 184, aff'd 
(1913) 210 F. 276. 
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story the audience would perceive on attending a 
performance, while omitting several incidents. A 
substantial part of the opera had not been reproduced, nor 
had the opera been adapted into a non-dramatic work. 82 
Impermissible abstracts 
In the Ricordi opera cases, far from substituting for or 
competing with the source works or in any way harming 
the copyright owner, the abstracts tended to pique readers 
into hearing the works, so benefitting the copyright owner. 
·Abstracts that harm the source work's copyright should, 
however, infringe it. 83 Two cases, a hundred years apart 
and from different sides of the world, illustrate the point. 
The first from Australia involved the familiar case of 
a newspaper's copying another paper's news, thus getting 
for free something its rival had to pay for or get its 
journalists to dig up. In 1872 the Melbourne newspaper, 
the Argus, started subscribing to Reuter's daily news 
service from England. It both published the news and also 
wrote off part of the cost by selling to other local papers 
the right to use the telegrams. In 1873, it successfully 
stopped a newspaper from copying the telegrams outright. 
Anticipating the International News Service v Associated 
Press84 decision in the United States 40 years later, the 
court said the Argus had a common law property right to 
prevent interference with news it had paid for. 85 
Two years later, however, the Gipps Land Mercury 
stopped paying the Argus for using its telegrams. Instead, 
it had a correspondent buy the Argus daily and telegraph 
summaries of the Reuter's material to it. The Mercury 
published these before copies of the Argus could arrive in 
town. This is how the Mercury typically transformed an 
Argus column. 
Argus version: 
ENGLISH RACING INTELLIGENCE 
- London, May 6 
The Chester Trades' Cup, of 500 sovs., added to a 
handicap sweep of 25 sovs. Two miles and a quarter. 
81 subs. Mr Heneage's chg Freeman, by Kettledrum-
Haricot, 6 yrs. 6st. 13lb., 1. 
GERMANY AND BELGIUM 
The Belgian government, in reply to a communication 
from the Chambers, promises to follow the initiative 
of Germany in a modification of the ecclesiastical laws. 
HEAL TH OF THE POPE 
The Pope is suffering from weaklless. 
Gipps Land Mercury version: 
Melboume 
The news about town to-day is that the Chester Cup, 
England, was won by Heney's [sic] Freeman. We also 
hear that the Belgian Government promises to follow 
the initiative of Germany in a modification of the 
ecclesiastical laws. The Pope, it is reported to-day, is 
suffering from weakness. 
82 Valcare11ghi v The Gramopho11e Co. Ltd, Note 71 above. 
83 Unless, of course, they amount to fair dealings. See 'Permitted 
Abridgments' above. 
84 ( 191~) 248 us 215. 
85 Wilso11 v Rowcrofi (1873) 4 Aust. Jurist Reps. 57, 61. 
If the Mercury thought it could get round the former 
decision by this strategy, it was sorely disappointed. The 
same judge who decided the prior litigation saw no 
difference between the two cases. This time, however, he 
chose to say the Argus had a copyright in the telegrams 
extending to facts gathered at great cost, especially where 
'the odour of the defendant's publication is so perfectly 
identical with the plaintiffs•.86 The Mercury had made a 
'copy, colourable alteration or adaptation' that should be 
enjoined. The Mercury might have sought refuge in the 
adage that 'there is no copyright in news', but it then 
would have had to avoid the expressions the Argus had 
used. 87 The cost of such major rewriting was probably 
little different from, and more bothersome than, buying 
the news from the Argus in the first place. 
A century later, a similar situation arose in New York. 
Wainwright Securities' business included preparing and 
circulating financial analyses of leading corporations to its 
clients. It sued the publisher of the weekly Wall Street 
Transcript in 1976 for systematically abstracting its 
analyses. The Transcript's advertising boasted that its 
readers would save 'hundreds of hours of reading'. A US 
judge said the Transcript's practice of providing abstracts 
- really executive summaries that lifted and strung 
together the key sentences of the source works - 'sucked 
the marrow from the bone of Wainwright's report'.88 A 
financial newspaper could, no doubt, occasionally use 
Wainwright's analyses in its stories, but could not 
systematically take them 'with the obvious intent, if not 
the effect, of fulfilling the demand· for the original 
work' .89 A pre-trial injunction was granted. 
Had the Transcript been allowed to continue, Wain-
wright would have had either to adopt costly precautions 
of secrecy or to shut down its business because many of 
its customers would have defected. The sort of business 
information Wainwright produced would become either 
dearer, less available, less reliable, or all three. Abstracts 
that end up increasing the cost of, or even eliminating, 
their source material ultimately serve no useful purpose. 
The US court, like its Australian predecessor a century 
earlier, decided the copyright owner of the source work 
should alone decide the terms, if any, under which 
abstracts that may compete directly with the source should 
circulate. 
. Conclusion 
The law relating to abridgments and abstracts does not 
always work clearly in practice. The uncertainty lies in 
predicting whether a work is original enough to have 
copyright, whether enough has been taken to amount to 
an infringement, and whether the taking is justified - all 
questions of fact and degree, as judges persist in saying. 
Any decision is also implicitly premised on a judge's view 
of the merits and demerits of the activities the parties are 
engaged in. This may cause risk-averse abridgers and 
86 Wilson v Luke, Note 23 above, at 140. Nobody bothered to 
point out that there was no evidence that Reuter's had assigned 
its Australian copyright to the Argus. 
87 Springfield v Thome, Note 28 above. 
88 H.C. Wainwright & Co. v Wall St. Tra11Scripr Corp. (1976) 418 
F. Supp. 620, 625. 
89 Wai11wright Securities Inc. v Wall St. Tra11scripr Corp., Note 72 
above, at 96, affirming the previous case. 
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abstract-writers to pay whatever the source work owner 
demands, to avoid the higher costs of determining the 
ultimate validity of a claim; the cost is passed on to users. 
The challenge is to devise a test that balances owners' and 
users' rights in such a way that both sides benefit from 
a work, without either being able to exploit the other 
through the uncertainties of the law. 
The working rule suggested earlier may help clarify 
matters: an abridgment or abstract can be made without 
the copyright owner's consent if it does not (1) substitute 
for the source work, (2) harm the work's present market, 
and (3) harm a potential market that ought fairly be the 
author's. Three cautions are needed. First, point (3) 
should be judged conservatively lest it entirely swallow 
points (1) and (2). Second, the relevant harm cannot come 
from any express or implied criticism contained in or 
accompanying the abridgment or abstract, since the right 
to criticise is possessed by all independently of 
copyright.9° Third, agreements reached among publishers 
and authors, without legislative backing, on what practices 
need permission should not, given the self-interest of the 
participants, affect others. Copyright laws should be 
rewritten in legislatures, not publishers' b<;>ardrooms. 
90 This is a little like 'fair use' as applied in the United States, 
for example, the recent parody case of Campbell v Acuff Rose Music 
Inc. (1994) 62 LW 4169, 4l75 to 4176 (US Sup. Ct). 
